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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Inherency is a puzzle that runs throughout patent law. Patents
are based upon descriptions of technology. The description of the
invention in a patent distinguishes it from previous technologies
described in the prior art. The description of the claimed invention
in a patent determines whether an accused device infringes the
patent. The description of the invention in a patent application is
used to determine whether the claimed invention is sufficiently
novel, useful, and nonobvious to merit a patent at all. Indeed, the
fundamental premise of patent law is that of a bargain between the
inventor and the public: the public authorizes twenty years of
exclusive rights in exchange for the publication of a detailed
description of how to make and use the claimed invention.
Technologies may have qualities that are unappreciated or
unidentified in a patent description, but which are nonetheless
present. The law refers to these unknown attributes as "inherent"
in the product or process. What should be done about such charac-
teristics or qualities of a technology that exist but are not explicitly
described, either through ignorance or inadvertence? This problem
is explicitly presented in at least five different patent doctrines:
anticipation,' the on-sale bar,2 priority disputes,' double-patenting,4
and enablement'; and it casts its shadow across the law governing
subject matter, infringement, and obviousness. The Federal Circuit
has decided dozens of cases involving inherency in the last twenty
years. Depending on how it has been applied,6 the inherency
doctrine permits defendants to invalidate a patent by showing that
even though the prior art did not expressly disclose what the
patentee claims to have invented, all or part of the patentee's
invention was inherent in a particular piece of prior art. It may also
permit patent owners to satisfy their obligation to provide an
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
2. Id. § 102(b).
3. Id. § 102(g)(1).
4. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 940-42 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
6. The caveat is intentional. Even the basic description of the doctrine is controverted,
supplying further evidence of just how confusing the doctrine has become.
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enabling disclosure, and perhaps even to prove a date of invention,
based on information that they do not disclose but that is inherent
in their invention.
Inherency is also perhaps the most elusive doctrine in all of
patent law. It has confused and annoyed generations of law
students. However, the confusion hardly ends there. Commentators
have struggled to explain the doctrine and have come up with
formulations strongly reminiscent of epicycles that are at least as
confusing as the case law.' The courts, too, are confused. The cases
appear to flatly contradict each other, are often accompanied by
dissents, and in the last three years alone have triggered one
abortive en banc rehearing8 and strong calls for a second.9 In
particular, the courts have split sharply over whether an element
can be inherent in a prior art reference even if people of ordinary
skill in the art do not appreciate the existence of that element.1"
7. For example, John Kilyk argues that the cases up through 1982 could be reconciled
on the basis that both "[slingle, appreciated prior uses and ... consistent result[s] of that which
was intended, regardless of appreciation so long as the involved product in issue is known"
are inherently anticipated. John Kilyk, Jr., Accidental Prior Use, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 392,
413-14 (1982). This explanation is both unnecessarily convoluted and incomplete in describing
more recent cases. See also Steven C. Carlson, Inherent Anticipation, 40 IDEA 297, 306-18
(2000) (proposing a focus on knowledge coupled with a three-part rule that treats physical
properties, methods, and uses differently); Irving N. Feit & Christina L. Warrick, Inherency
in Patent Law, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 21 (2003) (finding a conflict in inherency
cases and proposing to resolve it by focusing on the "objective understanding" of the prior art
based on the timing of disclosure by a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA));
Todd R. Miller, Patented Compounds Inherently Coproduced as Trace Impurities: Issues of
Inherent Anticipation and Literal Infringement, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 442 (2004) (identifying
a nine-part test attributable to another author); cf. Paul G. Alloway, Note, Inherently Difficult
Analysis for Inherent and Accidental Biotechnology Inventions, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 73, 73
(2004) ("Inherency is chaotic ....").
8. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 314 F.3d 1299, 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (vacating an earlier panel opinion and taking the case en banc). The
en banc appeal was dismissed when the panel wrote a new opinion that did not rely on
inherency. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051,
1052 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 995-96 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
10. One court attempted to reconcile the apparently conflicting cases involving knowledge
by distinguishing between limitations of structure, where knowledge of the characteristics of
the prior art is required, and natural laws, for which it is not. EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v.
Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This formulation
seems to suggest that if the element adds to patentability, knowledge is required. This
approach is mistaken insofar as it requires knowledge of an element that is determined to be
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In this Article, we argue that this confusion is largely unneces-
sary. Examining the facts of the cases offers a simple way to
understand them. While many courts have recited as gospel the idea
that inherency requires knowledge or appreciation of the inherent
element, in no case does the application of the inherency doctrine
actually turn on knowledge of the element. Indeed, on reflection,
application of a knowledge standard in inherency cases makes little
sense. Inherency by definition concerns things that people of
ordinary skill in the art do not know; if the person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA) would know of the presence of an
element based on the prior art disclosure, there is a straightforward
case of anticipation based on that disclosure and no need for the
inherency doctrine.1' Rather, the inherency cases are all ultimately
about whether the public already gets the benefit of the claimed
element or invention. If the public already benefits from the
invention, even if they don't know why, the invention is inherent in
the prior art. If the public doesn't benefit from the invention, there
is no inherency.
In Part I, we examine the main thread of inherency cases, those
arising out of the novelty and statutory bar provisions of the Patent
Act. We explain how the courts got off track in their focus on
knowledge and why a focus on benefit clearly and consistently
explains the doctrine. In Part II, we consider inherency in a
different context, one in which the inventor must show possession
of the claimed invention, either to prevent a "new matter" rejection
or to establish priority of invention. Finally, in Part III, we discuss
the broader implications of this rule, including what the inherency
doctrine may mean for patents on DNA sequences and patents on
drugs derived from traditional knowledge. A proper understanding
present in the prior art. As explained in Part I.C, the cases themselves do not impose any such
requirement. The mistake was dictum, though; the court itself found inherency despite the
lack of knowledge by the PHOSITA of the vapor explosion mechanism at issue in that case.
Id. at 1351.
11. The § 102(b) cases involving "hidden public use" prevent patenting when the public
knows either how to make or use the invention. See infra Part I.C.
There may be cases in which the PHOSITA would know something but the patentee did
not, but those too present straightforward cases of anticipation without the need for the
inherency doctrine, since the PHOSITA would understand a piece of prior art as teaching the
invention.
[Vol. 47:371
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of the inherency doctrine may offer a logical explanation for the
"product of nature" cases, undermining the last significant exception
to patentable subject matter.
I. ANTICIPATORY INHERENCY
Although the inherency problem manifests itself across a range
of patent doctrines, it is perhaps best known, and most often seen,
in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 102, the statutory section dealing with
novelty and "loss of right," the statutory bar to patentability. 12
Section 102 defines the novelty requirement in terms of public
knowledge or use, or description in print prior to the date of
invention. 3 It defines the statutory bar in terms of description in
print or public use or sale more than one year prior to the filing of
a patent application. 4 These criteria have led to a long line of cases
struggling to determine precisely what aspects of an invention need
to be known or described, what needs to be used or sold prior to the
critical date in order to defeat patentability, and, most especially,
what the consequence might be if the invention is inherent in the
prior art. The knowledge and written description bars don't
generally raise inherency concerns; an invention is either known or
described or not. But these questions proved much thornier in the
case of unwitting or inadvertent sales or uses.
A. False Starts
The story of inherency begins with the 1880 Supreme Court case
of Tilghman v. Proctor.5 The inventor in that case claimed a process
for breaking down animal fat into glycerine and free fatty acids,
both of which could be used to make products ranging from candles
to soap. 6 The process required mixing fat with water and subjecting
the mixture to high temperature and pressure. 7 As it turns out, the
same process of separating glycerine from fatty acids had undoubt-
12. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
13. Id. § 102(a).
14. Id. § 102(b).
15. 102 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1880).
16. Id. at 711.
17. Id. at 709.
2005] 375
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edly occurred fortuitously when a prior art steam engine was
lubricated with animal fat, since a steam engine has water,
pressure, and high temperature.18 The Court concluded that the
accidental anticipation of the patented process should not bar
Tilghman from getting a patent on the process. 9 The Court
emphasized that the separation of the tallow in the operation of the
prior art steam engine was neither recognized by those of skill in
the art nor used for the purpose for which it was later patented.2 °
Rather, it was considered an unintended waste product, not an
intended result of the use of the prior art machine. The Court wrote
that
[t] hose engaged in the art of making candles, or in any other art
in which fat acids are desirable, certainly never derived the
least hint from this accidental phenomenon in regard to any
practicable process for manufacturing such acids .... If the acids
were accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst the opera-
tors were in pursuit of other and different results, without
exciting attention and without its even being known what was
done or how it had been done, it would be absurd to say that this
was an anticipation of Tilghman's discovery.21
This language has become the standard formulation of the doctrine
of inherency. In Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper
Co.,22 for example, where the Court found that there was no
inherent production of the invention at all, the Court also noted in
the alternative that "accidental results, not intended and not
appreciated, do not constitute anticipation."23
The results in Tilghman and Eibel were overdetermined.24 In
Tilghman, the invention was neither understood nor used in the
prior art. Similarly, in Eibel, the Court was not persuaded that the
18. Id. at 711.
19. Id. at 712.
20. Id. at 711-12.
21. Id.
22. 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
23. Id. at 66 (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711).
24. Tilghman may be overdetermined for another reason-the Court expressed some
doubt as to whether the by-product was the same as the patented invention at all. 102 U.S.
at 711. However, simple organic chemistry argues that the by-products would be present. Cf.
infra note 70.
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invention was produced at all in the prior art, so it was free to state
the test for inherency without having actually to apply that test to
the case before it. As a result, in both cases the Court could be
imprecise in its formulation of the inherency test. And it was. The
Court in Tilghman offered two different reasons why the invention
was not inherently anticipated: those of skill in the art did not
understand that it was present in that art and the public was not
using or benefiting from the prior use of the process.25 Were both
elements required for inherency to attach? Would either one suffice
to prove inherency? Or was one of the factors dominant and the
other simply playing a supporting role? Because neither element
was present, the Court did not resolve these questions.
The result was a general statement of the inherency test that is
unworkable in practice and which has been responsible for much
of the doctrinal confusion that has resulted. The Federal Circuit
has repeatedly cited Tilghman for the proposition that inherent
anticipation requires the PHOSITA to recognize and understand
the presence of the anticipation in the prior art. In Continental
Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., for example, the court recited the
requirement that the missing element must be both necessarily
present and "that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary
skill."26 Continental Can is a standard citation on inherency, and
a number of subsequent Federal Circuit opinions repeat this
language. The reference to recognition and understanding in these
cases, however, was unnecessary to resolve them because, like
Tilghman, they had neither use nor recognition. In Continental Can,
for example, the factual debate was over whether ribs in a prior art
bottle were in fact hollow or solid, not whether their hollowness was
known to the PHOSITA.28 In other cases that recite the knowledge
25. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711-12.
26. 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d
743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999); ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Glaxo
Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Electro Med. Sys. v. Cooper Life
Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Similarly, most commentators take the
recognition requirement as gospel, trying to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies that result
by explaining away the many cases that do not in fact apply that requirement. See, e.g.,
Carlson, supra note 7, at 310-14; Feit & Warrick, supra note 7, at 18-21.
28. Cont7 Can, 948 F.2d at 1267-68.
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test, such as Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., the inherency claim
fails not because of lack of knowledge, but because no proof exists
that the supposedly inherent characteristic would be necessarily
produced by the prior art process.
29
The one case in which the Federal Circuit relied on the knowl-
edge component of inherency is the panel opinion in Elan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research.3" In that case, the prior art, a patent by Mullan, gave
a general description of embedding a particular Alzheimer-sensitive
human gene mutation in a mouse, but the prior inventor did not
actually make the transgenic mouse."1 Elan patented a transgenic
mouse containing the Alzheimer-sensitive human gene, distinguish-
ing the Mullan prior art by adding a limitation that the modified
polypeptide expressed by the Alzheimer gene be present in a
detectable amount.32 The district court found the patent anticipated,
reasoning that Elan's patent differed from Mullan's disclosure only
because of the "detectable" amount of the expressed polypeptide and
that this last element would be inherent in any implementation of
the Mullan disclosure.33 The panel opinion reversed.34 The court said
that inherency must be "known to be present in the subject matter
of the reference," and since Mullan did not know of this inherent
effect, the court found no anticipation. 5 Judge Dyk dissented,
saying that knowledge was not a requirement for inherency.36 The
Federal Circuit took the case en banc,3 v but then dismissed the case.
The panel issued a new opinion remanding for a determination of
whether Mullan enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to make the
Elan invention, with no discussion of the inherent element.3 8 As a
29. 304 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
30. 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
31. Id. at 1229-30.
32. Id. at 1226-27.
33. Id. at 1227.
34. Id. at 1223.
35. Id. at 1228-29.
36. Id. at 1231 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
37. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 314 F.3d 1299, 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
38. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
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result, Elan no longer stands for the proposition that inherency
requires the PHOSITA to have knowledge of the anticipation.39
B. Public Benefit
Knowledge, then, is often recited as an element in inherency
cases, but it never actually appears to have determined the outcome
of an appellate case.4" To the contrary, if the PHOSITA knows about
a prior use that includes all of the elements of the patent, there is
a clear-cut case of anticipation and no need to apply inherency at
all. The issue of inherency comes up precisely when the PHOSITA
at the time is not aware of an anticipating use.
The cases follow this logic, at least implicitly. A large number of
cases find inherent anticipation in the absence of knowledge.4'
If knowledge is not present, though, how then are we to test
inherency? Some commentators have come to the conclusion that
after Schering, the only factor required for inherency is proof that
the thing was in fact present,42 but that overstates the case. There
are still a number of cases that deny inherent anticipation even
when it is clear with hindsight that the invention was present in the
prior art.
Understanding inherency doctrine requires a closer look at the
cases that actually find inherent anticipation. In those cases, the
determining factor appears to be that the public has already
benefited from the presence of the claimed invention in the prior art,
even though it may not have been aware of the invention itself. The
Supreme Court stated the general principle in General Electric
Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.:43 "If A without mentioning the
element of strength patented a bulb which was extra strong, B could
39. There are also cases concerning priority of invention that rely on knowledge. Those
cases are discussed in Part II.B.
40. We have not reviewed every district court ruling on inherency, and so we cannot make
the same assertion as to district courts.
41. As Tracey Davies puts it, "[d]espite this commonly-cited [recognition] standard,
however, the courts frequently ignore--or outright contradict-this standard, appearing
rather, at least superficially, to only arbitrarily embrace the requirement of recognition of the
inherent element by a skilled artisan." Tracey B. Davies, Inherent Anticipation: Turning the
Written Description Requirement on Its Head, Paper Presented at the Eighth Annual
Advanced Patent Law Institute 4 (Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with authors).
42. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 452-53; Alloway, supra note 7, at 86-87.
43. 326 U.S. 242 (1945).
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not obtain a patent on the bulb because of its strength, though he
was the first to recognize that feature of it. '44 The Court here clearly
thinks of inherency as dependent on use of the characteristic, not
knowledge of it.
This focus on public benefit even in the absence of knowledge
is a consistent theme in the Federal Circuit cases that actually
find inherent anticipation. In Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,45 for example, the patent claimed a particular
formulation of a pharmaceutical compound called Form IV. During
litigation, the defendant discovered that an Australian company had
sold the pharmaceutical compound into the United States, and it
turned out, unbeknownst to either the buyer or the seller, that some
of the product that was sold was in fact Form IV.46 The court found
inherent anticipation under § 102(b), reasoning that if the product
sold actually possessed the limitations of the claim, § 102(b) barred
a patent whether or not the parties to the sale knew that the
product included those limitations.47 The court distinguished
Tilghman, saying that knowledge of the product did not matter
because the invention here, "having been sold, was decidedly
useful."48
Other cases have followed Abbott's rule in finding inherency
where the evidence indicates that a claimed compound was in fact
produced or sold in the prior art, even if those of skill in the art did
not know about the production or sale at the time. Most notable is
the decision in Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.49
Schering patented loratadine, branded as the allergy medicine
Claritin, and later patented a metabolite of loratadine that is
inherently produced in the human body when loratadine is
ingested.50 When Schering's patent on loratadine expired, Schering
began suing generics who copied loratadine after the first patent
expired for violating the newer metabolite patent.5 The court held
44. Id. at 247.
45. 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
46. Id. at 1317.
47. Id. at 1318.
48. Id. at 1319.
49. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 1375. Because the patent on the metabolite was filed after disclosure of
loratadine, loratadine itself was prior art to the metabolite patent. Id. at 1376.
51. Id. at 1376.
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that the metabolite was inherently produced when loratadine
entered the human body. 2 Indeed, Schering itself premised its
infringement claim on that inherent production. The court specifi-
cally rejected the idea, as embodied in the Elan panel opinion,53 that
inherency requires appreciation of the characteristics of the prior
art.54 Rather, the court found the metabolite patent inherently
anticipated because the public would necessarily obtain the benefit
of the metabolite by ingesting and metabolizing loratadine.55 While
three judges dissented from the decision not to take the case en
banc, their concern was the fact that loratadine itself had not
actually been used in public before the critical date; Judge Lourie's
dissent did not "question that when a pharmaceutical product has
been in actual public use prior to the filing of a patent application
on its metabolite, the metabolite will also have been in public use"
regardless of whether it was known to those of skill in the art.56
Schering and the rejection of Elan seem to have set the Federal
Circuit firmly on the right course, recognizing that knowledge is not
required for inherency. The court's 2004 decision in Toro Co. v.
Deere & Co.57 confirms this trend. In Toro, the Federal Circuit
expressly rejected previous cases that based inherency upon
knowledge or recognition by those of skill.5" Instead, the court
emphasized that the necessary presence of a claimed feature in a
prior art embodiment is the critical element of inherency: "[T]he fact
that a characteristic is a necessary feature or result of a prior-art
embodiment (that is itself sufficiently described and enabled) is
enough for inherent anticipation, even if that fact was unknown at
52. Id. at 1378.
53. See Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Educ. & Med. Research, 304 F.3d 1221
(Fed. Cir. 2002); supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
54. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1377.
55. Id. at 1380. Schering also argued that inherency could not apply because, unlike prior
inherency cases, the doctrine was being used here to show anticipation of the entire invention,
not just to supply one element missing from a prior art disclosure. The court correctly
concluded that inherency can apply to an entire invention, not just to supply a missing
element. Id. at 1379.
56. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Lourie,
J., dissenting). Other decisions recognizing that knowledge is not required include
MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
57. 355 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
58. Id. at 1320-21.
2005]
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the time of the prior invention." 9 Considering the inherent anticipa-
tion of a claim limitation in a previous patent, the court observed
that, for inherency, "neither description nor contemporaneous
recognition of these necessary features or results was required."6 °
The focus on public benefit is also bolstered by cases that reject
anticipation claims based on inherency in circumstances where-as
in Tilghman-the prior art did not in fact give the public the benefit
of the invention. One early case is Edison Electric Light Co. v.
Novelty Incandescent Lamp Co.6 In that case, Edison patented an
improved light bulb in which the placement of the wires was
changed.62 The evidence at trial showed that occasional manufactur-
ing defects in prior art light bulbs accidentally anticipated Edison's
new invention.63 The manufacturer was aware of the defects, but
rather than making use of them, threw the light bulbs out as
defective.64 The court found no inherency because the prior use
"gave nothing to the world"; indeed, it was treated as a problem
rather than a benefit and was never sold to the public.6" While the
court recited the standard "not understood or appreciated" language
from Tilghman,66 the facts of the case make it quite clear that it was
public benefit rather than knowledge that drove the court to reject
the inherency argument. In this case, the manufacturers did
understand what had happened. There was no inherency, however,
because they did not use it to the benefit of the world or communi-
cate to the public how they could use the design.
A focus on benefit rather than recognition is also the most logical
way to reconcile the classic opinion in In re Seaborg7 with the rest
of the inherency canon. In that case, Glenn Seaborg claimed
"element 95," a transuranic chemical element and therefore one not
present in nature.6" The court's discussion of inherency focused on
59. Id. at 1321.
60. Id.
61. 167 F. 977 (3d Cir. 1909).
62. Id. at 980-81.
63. Id. at 980.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
68. Id. at 996. Whether element 95 was an unpatentable "product of nature" occupied a
significant part of the court's opinion. Id. at 979-99.
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the fact that physicists knew from their calculations that element
95 was inherently produced in trace amounts by the operation of
nuclear reactors.69 The trace amounts of the element were inaccessi-
ble, however, because they were scattered amidst a comparatively
vast amount of radioactive uranium.7 ° Glenn Seaborg's contribution
was to isolate element 95 and therefore make it accessible to
physicists. The court held that Seaborg was entitled to patent
"element 95" itself.71 If recognition were the touchstone for
inherency, Seaborg would have come out the other way because it
is clear that physicists understood that element 95 was already
produced in Fermi's nuclear reactor. Instead, the court's opinion is
consistent with a focus on benefit. Seaborg's contribution was not
knowledge that the PHOSITA lacked, but the isolation of the
element itself, permitting it to be used-at least to the extent that
particle physicists really "use" an unstable, short-lived element-in
a way that the prior art did not.
To be sure, some might question the wisdom of this approach as
a policy matter. Part of the benefit the public gets from patentability
is knowledge of the patented invention, and in various contexts
patent law is willing to give patents even to those who were not the
first to invent because they were the first to disclose the invention
to the public. But in cases in which the public is already benefiting
from the invention, the additional value of learning exactly how or
why they benefit does not seem worth withdrawing from the public
the use of an invention they already enjoy.73 Courts could balance
those costs and benefits in each individual case, but only at the cost
of abandoning any intelligible rule for determining anticipation.
They have instead made the categorical judgment that an invention
69. Id. at 996. The court expressed some skepticism as to whether americium was in fact
produced in the reactor, since if it was, it was in undetectable amounts. Id. at 999; Miller,
supra note 7, at 443. But the physics of the nuclear reaction suggest that it would be.
70. The court noted that element 95 could not be "detected" in the reactor, but there was
no dispute that physicists understood that it would be present. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 999.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000) (denying patent to the first inventor if she
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it); id. § 102(b) (requiring public use to preclude another
from patenting).
73. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (suggesting that withdrawing
inventions from the public domain would be unconstitutional).
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already being used by the public shouldn't be patentable because
someone discovers information about how it works.
C. Knowledge and Use
By far the most common type of inherency case litigated in the
Federal Circuit involves efforts to patent a property or characteristic
of an existing product or process. Where the product or process
exists in the prior art and it inherently has a subsequently claimed
property or characteristic, the courts will find anticipation even
though no one knew of the property in the prior art. For example,
in In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation,74 the patent claimed the
discovery of the cancer-fighting effects of eating broccoli and
cauliflower sprouts.7" The court held that the claim to a process of
using cruciferous sprouts to treat cancer was anticipated since the
public was already eating broccoli sprouts and therefore getting the
cancer-fighting benefits, even though they were not aware of those
benefits.7 6 Similarly, in Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc.,77 the patent
claimed a range of known chemicals used as explosives and required
as an element of the claim that the explosives have "sufficient
aeration." 8 Because the chemicals were already used as explosives
and they would work as explosives only if they had sufficient
aeration, the prior art explosives inherently had such aeration.79
Thus, the court held that adding "sufficient aeration" as a limitation
did not avoid anticipation.' The court specifically rejected a
74. 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 1345.
76. Id. at 1351. To similar effect is In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Like
Cruciferous Sprout, the court held that a newly disclosed benefit of inhibiting fungal growth
on vegetables does not justify a patent on a process that was already known, even though the
PHOSITA did not know that the process inhibited fungal growth. Id. at 1577. The court
emphasized that the newly discovered benefit "is at least generically encompassed by the prior
art purpose of preventing the deterioration of leafy and head vegetables." Id. at 1578. In other
words, the public was using the process for purposes related to the property that the patentee
discovered, and therefore was already getting the antifungal benefits of the disclosed
property. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (claiming a newly discovered tumor-inhibiting property of a known method for
administering a drug did not render the known method patentable).
77. 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
78. Id. at 1346-48.
79. Id. at 1348.
80. Id. at 1348-49.
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proposed requirement that inherent anticipation require appreci-
ation: "Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent
characteristics or functioning of the prior art.""8 Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Barr Laboratories, Inc.82 held that Lilly's own prior patent on a
method of treating anxiety with Prozac inherently anticipated its
later patent on a method of blocking serotonin uptake, since Prozac
operates by inhibiting serotonin uptake.83 Another Federal Circuit
case found inherent anticipation where the prior art showed a
metal alloy in the patentee's claimed range of compositions, but not
the claimed attribute of "being characterized by good corrosion
resistance in hot brine environments."' The court found inherent
anticipation because the properties of the metal were inherent in
their structure."
Such cases are frequently cited to illustrate the so-called "incom-
plete" or "truncated" standard for enablement of anticipatory
references. Typically, enablement is thought of as set out in § 112:
in order to qualify for a patent, the inventor must teach those of
ordinary skill in the art how to both make and use the invention.86
Enablement also comes up in anticipation. To preclude a patent
under § 102, a reference must be enabling,8 but the standard for
enablement is somewhat different for prior art that might anticipate
a patent than it is for patentees. A prior art reference that enables
one of ordinary skill in the art either to make the invention or to use
it anticipates that invention. Thus, under the standard articulated
81. Id. at 1347; accord MEHLJBiophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
82. 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
83. Id. at 969-70. This holding was not heavily disputed, although the panel's conclusion
that the first Lilly patent was prior art, even though it was filed after the second patent, was
quite controversial. See id. at 975 (Newman, J., dissenting).
84. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting
U.S. Patent Application No. 455,964 (filed July 25, 1975)).
85. Id. at 782; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d
1430, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that for anticipation of a patent with a tear strength
limitation, the defendant need only show that prior art had the requisite strength, not that
people were aware of that strength); Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (finding anticipation where the reference discloses all the limits of the claim, even
though it does not disclose the desirable property discovered by the patentee, where the
property is inherent in the structure).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
87. Id. § 102.
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in In re Hafner,88 disclosure of how to make the claimed invention
is enough for anticipation, even if there is no disclosure of how
to use the invention.89 Publication of a structure, such as the
composition of a metal alloy, even without any disclosure of its
superior corrosion-resistant properties, is enough for anticipation.9 °
Subsequent discovery of a new use for the structure may occasion a
separate method patent for the new use, but not a claim to the
previously disclosed structure.
The inverse of these incomplete enablement cases is found in the
cases involving "hidden" public uses claimed to anticipate an
invention. Those cases consistently find anticipation where the
public knows how to use an invention, even if the nature of the
invention and how to make it remain secret. For example, in
Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected a
patent on an airline reservation system as anticipated by the prior
art SABRE system that had been in use for decades.91 The patent
holder argued that although SABRE had been in prior use, travel
agents and other users knew nothing of its inner workings, as the
essential algorithms were not apparent and the prior use could
not have enabled one of ordinary skill to build such a system.
Consequently, Lockwood argued, it could not anticipate or bar
patents to a later-developed system.92 The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument, however, holding that such enablement was not
required. The qualities of the SABRE system were available to the
public and the public knew how to use the prior art SABRE system,
even if it did not know how to make it.9"
A similar result is found under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) in the case of
Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp.,94 where a patent on
Surlyn-covered golf balls was held invalid due to the prior sale of
similar golf balls. The formula for making the prior art golf balls
had been kept secret and examination of the golf balls would not
have revealed their formulation. Consequently, the patent holder
88. 410 F.2d 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
89. Id. at 1405-06. The Federal Circuit reaffirmed Hafner in Rasmusson v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90. Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 782.
91. 107 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975).
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argued, the prior art invention had been abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed, and so it was not valid prior art under § 102(g).95 But the
court held that the golf balls were in public use: Even though their
nature might be veiled, the public received the benefit of their
characteristics, making them valid prior art.9"
Although these cases do not explicitly use the language of
inherency, the issue is clearly the same: Devices that are available
to the public, such as a computer reservation system or a golf ball,
possess valuable unseen or concealed qualities.97 These cases are
sometimes designated "hidden public use" cases: the item is in
public use, but its workings or qualities are not revealed by public
inspection.98 Such prior uses prevent a later patent because the
public gets the benefit of the invention by actually using the
product-or at least by being taught how to use it-even though its
workings or qualities are naturally hidden.99
These results are consistent with inherency cases involving
process claims-inventions where a use itself rather than a struc-
ture is the invention. In WL. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., the Federal Circuit made it clear that a process claim is
anticipated if it reads on the consistent, reproducible, commercial
operation of a machine, even if the user did not appreciate that the
machine performed the process.100 Other opinions have taken the
same approach, finding inherency "if a structure in the prior art
necessarily functions in accordance with the limitations of a process
or method claim,' ' 101 with no discussion of any requirement that the
PHOSITA be aware of this function.102
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 36-37.
97. The only difference appears to be that in these cases, unlike the true inherency cases,
the manufacturer knows what they are making, but that distinction should be of little
consequence.
98. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 463 (3d ed. 2002).
99. Id.
100. 721 F.2d 1540, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
101. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
102. Accord Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(finding inherency "whether or not the seller recognized that his process possessed the
claimed characteristics" if the "natural result flowing from the operation of the process ...
would necessarily result in achievement of each of the claim limitations"). Scaltech might
seem an inequitable case because the court held that an offer to use a process to produce a
product was an "offer for sale" of the process because the process would inherently have been
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The Gore court clearly favored use over knowledge in its
inherency analysis, though it is worth noting that the case limits
itself to consistent, reproducible, commercial uses.10 3 The point of
these limitations seems to be evidentiary-the court is trying to be
sure in retrospect that an unrecognized process or product was in
fact inherent in the prior art.11 4 At the same time, knowledge of a
given use does not necessarily confer upon the public the benefit of
other uses for the same structure. In Rapoport v. Dement,10 5 the
court rejected an argument that the claimed use of buspirone to
treat sleep apnea was inherently anticipated by its use for a
performed had the offer been accepted, even though no one appreciated it at the time. The
inequity of raising a § 102(b) bar on an invention the patentee did not appreciate, and never
in fact actually sold, is a function of the rule that even unconsummated offers can bar a
patent.
103. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1548-49.
104. MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1999), says an invention is not inherently present unless it is always produced by the prior
art process. See also Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Crown
Operations Int'l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Mentor H/S, Inc.
v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that inherency
"may not be established by probabilities or possibilities"). This requirement has been referred
to as "inevitability." See Davies, supra note 41, at 3-4. That seems to overstate the rule. The
right question is whether we are confident that the patented invention was present in the
prior art, even if it was not always present. See Cynthia Chen, Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and Its Implications,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 96 (2005) (speaking of "absolute certainty"). In Abbott, for
instance, the court found inherency even though only some of the compound sold into the
United States was the anticipating Form IV. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d
1315, 1317 (1999). The better understanding of the inevitability cases is that if the evidence
does not prove that the invention was present at all in the prior art, there can be no
inherency. Mentor, 244 F.3d at 1376 (rejecting inherency based on "probabilities or
possibilities"); Scaltech, 178 F.3d at 1384 (same). An evidentiary certainty, even if partial,
should suffice.
Occasionally, courts err by finding inherency even where it is not certain that the invention
was present in the prior art. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997), is such a case.
There, the majority held that a conical oil dispenser inherently anticipated a claim to a conical
popcorn dispenser, reasoning that the prior art could be resized to serve as a popcorn
dispenser. Id. at 1476-77. Judge Newman dissented, correctly observing that an inherent
disclosure "is necessarily contained in the prior art" and that in this case, the oil can was not
of the right size to dispense popcorn and was not in fact serving that purpose. Id. at 1481
(Newman, J., dissenting). If the oil can was not in fact being used as a popcorn dispenser,
Judge Newman is correct-Schreiber is really a case about obviousness rather than inherency.
Id.
105. 254 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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different purpose, to treat anxiety. 106 The prior art did not teach or
suggest the use of the drug on apnea patients, and unlike the
inherent benefit arising from the product in Cruciferous Sprout,
apnea patients were not benefiting from the drug without being
aware of it. 107 Thus, in the use cases as well as the structure cases,
the presence or absence of public benefit determines whether the
inherency doctrine will apply.
The jurisprudence regarding structure and use does suggest
that the court in Seaborg may not have reached the right result
given the language of Seaborg's claim. The courts have made it clear
in other cases that if a compound is present in nature, one who first
discovers a use for the compound may not patent the compound
itself.' On this view, Seaborg should have been entitled at most to
a patent on isolated or purified element 95, because he did not
invent the element itself.19 Properly speaking, however, this is not
an inherency issue at all, but a pure question of anticipation. The
fact that the prior art taught the making of a product, even if it did
not enable the use, is generally enough to preclude patenting of the
product itself,"0 relegating those who give the public the benefit of
its use a patent on the isolated or purified, and thus useful, form of
the product.
II. POSSESSORY INHERENCY
While the overwhelming majority of inherency cases come up as
questions of anticipation or public use bars under § 102, the
inherency doctrine appears in other contexts as well. Section 112 of
the Patent Act requires the inventor to provide a written description
of the invention sufficient to enable those of ordinary skill to make
and use the invention;"' conveying such information to the public
is the price for receiving exclusive rights in the invention. Requiring
the description also ensures that the inventor had "possession" of
106. Id. at 1063.
107. Id. at 1060-63.
108. See, e.g., In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
109. Cf. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affid in part,
rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (permitting the patenting of a natural chemical in its
isolated and purified form, where the purification gave it a new commercial use).
110. See Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 781-82 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).
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the invention and deters the introduction of "new matter" into the
application. In a sense, the description requirement is intended to
keep the inventor honest, preventing her from changing her story as
to the nature of the invention later in the course of prosecuting the
patent application.
The written description requirement is also closely linked with
the conception standard for establishing invention. The written
description may be used to show the date by which the inventor
had fully conceived of the invention, by demonstrating possession
of the invention as of a certain date. Because the United States
grants patents to the first inventor, the description in the patent
application may be important to establishing an inventor's priority
date if others claim to have invented first. Other evidence showing
conception prior to the filing of a patent application will need to
show the same degree of detail, as the Federal Circuit has reasoned
that "one cannot describe what one has not conceived." '112 Thus, both
disclosure and conception may raise issues of inherency, although
inherency may play out differently in each of these contexts for
policy reasons.
A. Disclosure Cases
Disclosure cases that raise inherency questions tend to arise
when the patentee files a continuation application during prosecu-
tion, adding new claims that were not present in the original
application, and later seeks to claim priority to the original
application. The Federal Circuit has held that where the new claims
are drawn to a characteristic that was in fact present in the
originally disclosed product or process, those new claims are
enabled, even absent knowledge of the characteristic at the time of
the original application. For example, in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera
International, Inc.," 3 the patent application showed a sintered
ceramic body. The patentee filed a continuation-in-part (CIP)
application that disclosed and claimed an "equiaxed microstructure"
that was a necessary property of this ceramic." 4 The court found
112. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
113. 835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 1420.
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priority to the original application because the original disclosure
inherently conveyed that the inventor possessed an invention with
the characteristic of equiaxed microstructure, even though the
property was not known when the first application was filed."'
Similarly, in Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc.,"' the
Federal Circuit held that a CIP was entitled to the priority date of
the original application because a new limitation, added at the
examiner's insistence, that a door be "essentially devoid of glass
fibers for a predetermined depth of at least 0.005 inch" was inherent
in the previously disclosed characteristics of the patentee's door." 7
Once again, the court focused on whether the fibers were in fact
absent in the door, not whether the patentee or the PHOSITA would
recognize their absence."'
The application of inherency principles to disclosure under § 112
seems at first blush to make sense, given that enablement by the
patentee is in some sense the flip side of enablement by the prior art
in the anticipation cases. It is not clear, however, that the two
should in fact be treated as entirely parallel. Section 112 requires
that the patentee teach the PHOSITA how to both make and use
the patented invention." 9 For product patents, this means detailed
disclosure of the structure of the invention and at least one
substantial use. A disclosure of this type, as we have seen, enables
and dominates future new uses of the claimed structure, even
though newly discovered uses may be entitled to their own subservi-
ent patents. By contrast, as we have also seen, a prior art reference
that teaches either the making or the use of the invention will
preclude patentability. Kennecott and Therma-Tru do not present
115. Id. at 1423.
116. 44 F.3d 988 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 991-93.
118. Id. at 992-93. By contrast, where courts find no inherent enablement, it is generally
because the product characteristic was not in fact inevitable. See Applied Materials, Inc. v.
Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Archer,
C.J., concurring) (reasoning that a CIP was not entitled to claim priority to an original
application where the CIP added claims referring to substrate crystals "with substantially no
crystallographic slip," and it was not clear from trial testimony whether the priority
application products had crystallographic slippage). Judge Archer was the only member of the
majority to reach the inherency issue; Judge Newman dissented. As a result, the opinion is
of doubtful precedential significance, but it is consistent with results in the other enablement
cases.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).
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this difference because the manufacturing process taught in both
cases actually did show the PHOSITA how to make and use the
inherent feature, even if its nature was not fully understood. But
the difference becomes important in the cases we discuss in the next
section.
B. Priority Cases
Inherency is also sometimes raised as an issue when two putative
inventors each claim to have been the first to reduce their invention
to practice. Unlike the anticipation and enablement cases, the
priority cases require knowledge to establish reduction to practice
-specifically, an understanding and appreciation of the benefits of
the invention. Both conception and reduction to practice require this
appreciation.
For example, the court in Hitzeman v. Rutter20 rejected a claim
to have conceived an invention where the patent applicant was not
in fact aware of the properties of the invention at the time, but later
discovered that they were inherent in his work.' 2 ' Inherent proper-
ties, the court observed, can only exist in the context of priority if
they are "redundant" or "add[] nothing to the count," which is to say,
if they were not claimed elements of the invention.'22 In Mycogen
Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., the court said that
[t]he precise language of the reduction to practice test states "[i]t
is well-settled that conception and reduction to practice cannot
be established nunc pro tunc. There must be contemporaneous
recognition and appreciation of the invention represented by the
counts."'23
120. 243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
121. Id. at 1354-55.
122. Id. at 1355.
123. 243 F.3d 1316, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Breen v. Henshaw, 472 F.2d 1398, 1401
(C.C.P.A. 1973)) (second alteration in original); see also Manning v. Paradis, 296 F.3d 1098
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(summarizing past cases by stating that "[t]hese cases trumpet, therefore, the principle that
a reduction to practice does not occur until the inventor has determined that the invention
will work for its intended purpose").
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The basis for this requirement actually has nothing to do with the
inherency doctrine. Indeed, it does not make sense to talk of priority
cases as inherency cases at all. Rather, courts require proof of
recognition and appreciation in order for the patent applicant to
prove possession of the invention as of a certain date.'24 Proof of
possession is a characteristic of the written description doctrine,125
and is particularly important in priority cases because in those
cases, by definition, two different people invented the same thing,
and it must be decided who really possessed the invention first. If
the claimed invention is unappreciated, then there can have been no
conception, and hence no invention. The references to inherency in
the priority cases may well be responsible for confusing the issue in
other contexts, because the possession requirement of the written
description doctrine has been intermingled with inherency.
Contrasting Chen v. Bouchard 2 ' with the Kyocera case may help
to illustrate the asymmetry between the possession requirement in
priority, the enablement requirement in disclosure, and the
inherency rule in anticipation. Chen was a priority case in which
one of the claimants attempted to rely on the inherent presence of
the invention to prove conception.'27 Chen manufactured a solution
containing two chemicals, but only properly characterized one of
them; he mischaracterized the solution as containing a different set
of substances than were actually present. 28 When he later correctly
recognized the presence of the second, more valuable chemical in the
solution, he tried to claim it, but Bouchard had claimed the latter
chemical first.'29 The court rejected Chen's attempt to rely on his
erroneous disclosure to prove that he had invented the second
chemical when he unwittingly produced it along with the first. 30
The court held that invention requires possession-and therefore
124. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, 129 F.3d at 593.
125. Compare Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998), where the court found
no written description of a genus of multiple shapes for hip implants in a patent specification
that disclosed only conical shapes. The court said that for the written description requirement
to be satisfied, missing descriptive matter "must necessarily be present in the parent
application's specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a disclosure."
Id. at 1159.
126. 347 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
127. Id. at 1305.
128. Id. at 1301.
129. Id. at 1301, 1304.
130. Id. at 1305-07.
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written description--of the second chemical."' But unlike Kyocera,
where the additional description of "equiaxed microstrucure" merely
characterized an inherent property already present in the invention
disclosed, Chen had in fact described the wrong chemical. He had
also claimed the method of production that inherently led to
creation of the unrecognized chemical, but claiming a process is not
the same as claiming the product of that process.132
As a result, Chen can be read to stand for the proposition that
inherent production cannot be used as a basis for proving invention
because the patentee has not in fact described the thing that she
claims to have invented. Suppose that Chen's product, incorporating
both the first and second chemicals, although he did not know about
the second, was in public use before Bouchard made his discovery.
Under the cases discussed in Part II.A, the court would have no
trouble concluding that Chen's public use of the chemical antici-
pated Bouchard's patent application. Bouchard could avoid
anticipation under § 102 only if he could show that the public did
not get the benefit of the second chemical from Chen's use. If the
public was benefiting from the second chemical, the case is
indistinguishable from Schering. The result is an asymmetry
between anticipation and priority-an inherent but unappreciated
prior use that benefits the public will not qualify for a patent, but it
will prevent others from later patenting the invention being used.
This result, while seemingly odd in its asymmetry, makes sense
as a policy matter. In order to get a patent, an inventor must
describe the invention in order to show that she is in possession of
it. If she hasn't actually recognized the claimed invention, she can't
do that, even though she may enable people to make and use the
invention unwittingly. By contrast, if society is already benefiting
from the invention, we do not want to give anyone else a patent on
it. If the public is not getting the benefit of it, there is no inherent
disclosure and hence no anticipation. In each case, the public benefit
is paramount, but in a different context. Denying a patent in the
case of inherent anticipation allows the public to retain the
nonexclusive use of an invention that they are already enjoying,
131. Id.
132. Cf. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (indicating that the patentability
of a product is a separate issue from the patentability of the method by which it is made); In
re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating the same).
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while denying a patent to an inventor who fails to recognize an
inherently prior invention preserves the option of a reward to
subsequent inventors who recognize the invention and deliver its
benefits to the public more quickly.'33
III. EXTENDING INHERENCY ANALYSIS
The cases we have reviewed here reveal a common doctrinal
thread in the issue of inherency: prior public benefit from a product
that is actually used is sufficient to prevent patentability, even if
people do not know that they are using and benefiting from it. This
inherency principle combines with more traditional forms of
anticipation, in which there is public knowledge of how to make the
product, or public knowledge of how to use the product. These issues
arise from the intricate concatenation of "knowledge" and "use"
terminology dispersed throughout §§ 102, 112, 119 and 120 of the
patent statute. The elements of 'knowledge" and "use" appear in
other doctrinal roles, and sometimes in other guises, in other
sections of the patent statute. In this final section, we consider how
the inherency doctrine, and particularly our "public benefit"
formulation of inherency, may affect the operation of these other
statutory sections, especially the sections on infringement and
subject matter requirements for patentability.
A. Inherent Obviousness
So far, we have considered inherency under the novelty and
statutory bar provisions of the patent statute, as well as under those
provisions requiring disclosure and those assigning priority. But
these are not the only requirements for patentability. The invention
must also be nonobvious as defined in § 103.134 Section 102 novelty
and statutory bar references are part of the prior art considered for
obviousness analysis under § 103. This raises the possibility that
133. This seems in some tension with the rules in § 102(b) and § 102(g) that encourage
disclosure by treating affirmative concealment as disqualifying something as prior art, even
if the public is benefiting from its use. However, the tension seems less a problem with the
inherency doctrine than illustrative of a larger doctrinal confusion in § 102 over whether the
right standard is one of absolute novelty or of relative novelty.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
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prior art inherently containing part, but not all, of the claimed
invention could be fair game for an assessment of obviousness, and
so the inherency problem deserves some consideration in this
context.
Unlike anticipation and statutory bars, we do not expect
inherency to be a significant issue in obviousness. By its own terms,
§ 103 eliminates much of the problem of inherency. Under § 103,
obviousness analysis is geared to the knowledge of the PHOSITA.'35
Equally important, such knowledge is measured at the time the
invention was made.1 6 Hindsight reconstruction of the invention,
looking back at the prior art to second-guess the inventor once the
invention is available, is anathema to an obviousness assessment. 137
But inherency is all about hindsight-a recognition today that an
invention was present in the prior art, even though it was not
understood to be there at the time.
Given the hindsight limitations on obviousness, we expect the role
of inherency under § 103 to be extremely limited, if not altogether
nonexistent. One very narrow role for inherency might arise out of
another difference between § 103 obviousness analysis and § 102
novelty analysis: the permissibility of combining references under
§ 103. Whereas § 102 requires that every element of the claimed
invention be present in a single reference in order for the invention
to be anticipated, § 103 allows assessment of obviousness against
multiple references, provided that at the time of invention the
PHOSITA would be motivated to combine those references and
would have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining the claimed
invention by doing so. 3
8
A surprising instance of inherency from combined § 103 refer-
ences arises out of the doctrine developed by the Federal Circuit
in In re Dillon, where the inventor claimed both the combination
of tetra-orthoesters with hydrocarbon fuel and the use of tetra-
orthoesters to reduce soot emissions from combustion of hydro-
carbon fuels.'39 Both tetra-orthoesters and a closely related class
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
138. Id.
139. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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of molecules, tri-orthoesters, were known in the prior art.
Combinations of tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters with hydrau-
lic fluids for scavenging water in such fluids were known, as were
combinations of tri-orthoesters and hydrocarbon fuels for the same
purpose. The specific, claimed combination of tetra-orthoesters and
hydrocarbon fuels was not known in the prior art, nor was the use
of either tri-orthoesters or tetra-orthoesters for reducing soot
emissions."4
The Patent Office rejected the compositions claims as obvious,
reasoning that the combination of tetra-orthoesters and hydrocar-
bon fuel was suggested, albeit for a different purpose, by the known
tri-orthoester fuel combinations and the structural similarity of the
two types of orthoesters."l The Federal Circuit, en banc, affirmed
the rejection, holding that the use of a structurally similar molecule
in prior art compositions, even for a different purpose, rendered the
composition claims prima facie obvious.'42 The court held that the
inventor could rebut the prima facie case of obviousness by showing
that the structurally similar prior art compositions did not have the
same properties as the claimed compositions-in other words, that
the properties of the new compositions were not inherently present
in the similar prior art compositions.143
Dillon was unable to present such a rebuttal in the particular
case, as her application showed that in fact the tri-orthoesters had
the same soot-reducing property as the claimed tetra-orthoesters,
even though people didn't know that either had that property
at the time of her invention. The Federal Circuit's articulation of
a rebuttal standard that we might term "reverse inherency" or
"inherent absence" is striking. In Dillon, a motivation to combine
the prior art references was present, although for a purpose
different than that discovered by the inventor. As it happens,
such a combination would result in a composition with properties
unknown to, and unexpected by, the PHOSITA. Consequently, to
show nonobviousness, the inventor would have had to show that the
PHOSITA's reasonable expectation in combining the prior art
references would fail from an objective standpoint because the novel
140. Id. at 692-94.
141. Id. at 691.
142. Id. at 692-94.
143. Id. at 694.
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property was inherently absent-not simply unknown to the
PHOSITA, but in fact not objectively present in the prior art
compositions.
This outcome seems congruent with the anticipation cases
considering "new uses" of known structures. As we have indicated
above, unknown and inherent uses of known structures are eligible
for an improvement patent, but they confer no rights to the prior art
structure. We have also noted the inherency ramifications of the
structural disclosure rule from In re Hafner. Some commentators
have observed that disclosure of a structure without a use will
anticipate only the particular structure under the Hafner rule, as
the absence of a disclosed use implies a lack of motivation to
create structurally similar products.144 The Dillon corollary, though,
is that when the prior art discloses a different use from that later
developed by an inventor, the inventor of a structurally related
chemical will either be limited to a process patent for the new use
or be forced to prove inherent absence of the new property in the old
chemical in order to obtain a product patent.
Similarly, Dillon's problem looks a bit like that in the Cruciferous
Sprout case. Like the patentee there, Dillon identified a previously
unknown but inherent property; the difference is that she claimed
a new but structurally obvious chemical. Because people would have
been motivated to make the new chemical for the same reason as
they made the old one, the only way Dillon could show patentability
would be to demonstrate a new property of the new chemical.
Because it turned out that the old chemical inherently had the
property she identified, her new chemical was held an obvious
variant of the old.
An analysis of Dillon also suggests a limited role for direct
inherency under § 103. A variation on the facts of Chen v. Bouchard,
taken from Bouchard's point of view, provides a possible scenario for
obviousness inherency. Consider the situation in which the prior
art reveals substances A and B, and provides the motivation to
combine these substances to produce substance C. Assuming that
there would be a reasonable likelihood of success in obtaining C,
this combination is obvious under § 103. Undisclosed in the prior
art, however, is the fact that combining A and B will also produce
144. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 98, at 832.
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another substance, D. The prior art provides the motivation to
combine A and B, but not for the purpose of obtaining D. Can the
first to discover D claim it, much as Bouchard claimed the unappre-
ciated product of Chen's synthesis, when it was inherent in the
obvious combination of § 103 prior art materials?
This scenario is very close to the situation in Dillon, in that a
motivation to combine the prior art references exists, though here
the PHOSITA cannot foresee the new product to be generated,
rather than the new use of an expected product, as was the case in
Dillon. As in Dillon, given that there is a motivation to combine the
materials, the answer as to the obviousness of the inherent product
depends first upon the nature of the claims. The combination of the
known starting materials was obvious, but the inventor in this
situation is not claiming the known process of combination-he is
claiming the unexpected product.'45 As the law stands today, the
process of making D seems obvious, since the PHOSITA was already
motivated to combine A and B.'46 But the inventor may be entitled
to a product patent on D itself, because the prior art did not suggest
that combining A and B would produce D, and in fact the combina-
tion produces unexpected results.147
But resolution of the issue also depends upon consideration of the
applicable standard for "reasonable likelihood of success" in
combining the materials. If the likelihood of success is viewed as a
subjective question-that is, would the PHOSITA have expected the
outcome of the combination?-the answer must be that the
PHOSITA would not: the motivation to combine was directed to
production of a different compound. On the other hand, if the
likelihood of success is purely objective-that is, would one who
combined A and B in fact succeed in producing D?-one could
construct a theory under which the production of D is obvious: the
145. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (indicating that a product's
obviousness is distinct from its production method's obviousness); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (allowing a composition patent regardless of the method).
146. See In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Biotechnological processes may be an exception, not because of any difference
in the technology, but for the simple reason that Congress passed a statute defining such
changes as necessarily nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000).
147. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d at 1572. "Unexpected results" are a secondary consideration
supporting a finding of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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PHOSITA is motivated to combine A and B, and the combination
will successfully produce the new substance, although unexpectedly.
We think that, once again, the public benefit standard provides
the correct guidance to this conundrum. The public is presumably
receiving no benefit today from substance D, since it is not actually
present in the prior art and no one has been motivated to produce
it. It would be congruent with patent policy to reward an inventor
who places knowledge of the inherent compound into the public's
possession. For similar reasons, the jurisprudence under § 103
rejects a finding of obviousness where the combination is merely
"obvious to try"-that is, where there exists motivation to try a
combination, but there is no reasonable expectation as to the
outcome. Here, the outcome is truly unknown and unappreciated,
and unanticipated new benefits are the sine qua non of non-
obviousness determinations. By contrast, the PHOSITA is already
motivated to combine A and B, so it would seem unreasonable to
grant a patent on the process of combining the two.
B. Inherent Infringement
An additional recognizable (but perhaps unappreciated) manifes-
tation of inherency is found in the exclusive rights granted to the
patent holder: the exclusive rights to make and use the claimed
invention, as well as exclusive rights to the specific uses of selling,
offering for sale, and importing the claimed invention.14 It is a
well-established maxim of patent law that anything that would
anticipate a patent if it predated the invention will infringe if it is
introduced later than the issuance of the patent.'49
148. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Under § 271(b), the patent owner may also obtain some
limited ability under certain circumstances to control the description of the claimed invention
in a printed publication. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). This is not a general exclusive right of the patent holder, presumably in part
because public disclosure of the invention is part of the quid pro quo for obtaining a patent.
Such a prohibition might also raise certain First Amendment issues. See Dan L. Burk,
Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000). As a practical matter, the availability of an
enabling disclosure in the published patent makes control over republication of the disclosure
less important.
149. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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Even though the publication of the patent's enabling disclosure
places the knowledge to make and use the claimed invention
constructively in the hands of the public, information dissemination
is not perfect, and defendants may still make or use the invention
without knowing they are doing so. As in the case of anticipation,
the presence of the claimed invention need not be known or even
knowable for infringement to occur, as long as there is certainty
that it is there. In effect, this makes infringement a strict liability
offense; 50 the public's ignorance of the fact that it is making the
invention covered by the patent no more excuses unauthorized
making or using the invention than the inventor's ignorance that
the public already had the benefit of the claimed invention would
excuse the improper issue of a patent on that invention.
The symmetric nature of inherent anticipation and inherent
infringement liability is apparent in the Federal Circuit's opinion
in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,' in which the
court held that inadvertent production of trace amounts of a
pharmaceutical compound may constitute infringement of a claim
unambiguously drawn to that compound. Indeed, an accused
infringer's inability to detect such traces of the claimed compound
is irrelevant to the infringement inquiry.'52 The opinion underscores
the resonance with § 102 by extending this analysis to hold that, by
the same token, the inventor's inability to detect such traces of a
structurally claimed compound more than a year prior to the date
of filing a patent is no bar to the application of the inherency
doctrine."'
150. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law,
17 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 799 (2002). While Blair and Cotter claim that the notice and marking
requirements take patent law out of the realm of strict liability, that is not true here. Id. at
800-04. Where the defendant is not even aware that he is producing the patented invention,
giving him notice of the patent by marking patented products will not affect his behavior.
151. 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc),
reinstated in relevant part, 403 F.3d 1331, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
152. Id. at 1315. Judge Richard A. Posner, sitting by designation as the district court judge,
rejected the claim of infringement in this case because the defendant had not acted
voluntarily in inadvertently producing the infringing product. See SmithKline Beecham Corp.
v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1043-45, 1052 (N.D. InI. 2003), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The Federal Circuit reversed on this ground, though it ultimately
invalidated the patent for the same reason-the inherent production that infringed also
anticipated the patent. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1316.
153. The original panel opinion on experimental use was vacated en banc. SmithKline
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As in the case of anticipation, infringement is asymmetric to
enablement; either the making or the use of the claimed invention
is sufficient to trigger the statute. Such inadvertent infringement
by making is well illustrated by the facts of Monsanto v.
Schmeiser,5 a Canadian infringement case decided under section
42 of the Canadian Patent Act, the parallel provision to 35 U.S.C.
§ 271. Mr. Schmeiser, a canola farmer, was found to have infringed
a Monsanto patent covering genetically modified "Roundup Ready"
canola plants by growing such plants without authorization on his
farm. Mr. Schmeiser alleged that the presence of infringing plants
on his land was unintentional and involuntary, and thus not an
infringement. He argued that he did not "use" the claimed invention
because the plants either sprouted from Monsanto seeds blown
there by the wind or resulted from the cross-pollination of his own
plants by Monsanto plants grown in his neighbor's fields. Even
assuming that Mr. Schmeiser's explanation for the presence of the
plants was correct, his intent and knowledge were held to be
irrelevant to the question of infringing "use. ' The same results
would be expected under the U.S. provision; every element of the
claimed invention is inherently present in the accused device,
whether the alleged infringer was aware of its presence or not.
Once again, benefit would properly seem to prevail over knowl-
edge. While Schmeiser arguably did not know that he was producing
the patented plants, he was benefiting from those plants by selling
the canola and replanting the seeds. A public use of that type would
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). On remand,
the Federal Circuit rested its conclusion that the patent was invalid firmly on inherency.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Judge
Gajarsa, concurring, would have held that patents written in such a way as to cover
inadvertent production through natural processes were not patentable subject matter. Id. at
1347, 1359-62 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
154. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C. 256, affd, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, affd in
relevant part, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902; see also Drew Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent
Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 581 n.27 (2004). Judge Gajarsa's concurrence in SmithKline
suggests he disagrees that this can be patent infringement. 365 F.3d at 1328-31 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
155. Monsanto, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902; cf. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342-43
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a farmer who saved and replanted seeds generated by natural
growth from patented seeds that he purchased from Monsanto infringed Monsanto's patents
by making the patented invention). For a discussion of these issues, see Kershen, supra note
154.
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anticipate Monsanto's invention if it occurred prior to patenting,
and it infringes if it occurs after.
C. Inherent Products of Nature
Perhaps the most striking ramification of the inherency doctrine
is its implications for the subject matter doctrine in patent law.
Section 101 of the Patent Act specifies that patents may issue for
new and useful processes, machines, compositions of matter, and
articles of manufacture. 6' Over the years, this list of categories has
been perceived to exclude various types of subject matter from
patentability. In truth, the list largely provoked lawyerly word
games, as inventors and their representatives applied different
labels to ostensibly unpatentable subject matter in order to fit it
into one or more of the categories. The Patent Office accepted
applications only so long as the proper subject matter incantation
was recited.
Beginning with the Supreme Court's holding in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, however, courts have treated the subject matter
recitations as illustrative, rather than exhaustive, and taken
seriously the maxim that patentable subject matter extends to
"anything under the sun that is made by man[kind]."'57 As a result,
the subject matter barriers to patentability began to collapse.
The courts rejected the idea that patents were limited to the
technological arts, 58 opening the door to patenting the liberal arts
and professions.' 59 They have overruled the traditional exclusion for
business method patents. 6 ° They have not expressly overruled the
156. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
157. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); cf. Harvard Coll. v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (holding that
the Canadian Patent Act, unlike the United States Patent Act, does not automatically cover
new technologies and specifically does not encompass transgenic higher organisms).
158. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970), drew this line, but the software
cases have since eroded it. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 959, 970 (1986) (describing Musgrave as the "high water mark of rationality" in
software patenting).
159. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J.,
dissenting in part) (noting that under the court's precedents, there was nothing to prevent the
patenting of a new song); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 1139 (1999) (exploring the expansion of patentable subject matter).
160. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) ("As an alternative ground for invalidating the ... patent under § 101, the court
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exemption for abstract ideas, but neither have they applied it in
the last 150 years.'6 ' The inevitable endpoint of this process was
reached in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finance
Group, Inc., where the Federal Circuit held that patentable subject
matter extends to any product of human ingenuity that yields a
"useful ... result."'162
Since the State Street decision, almost the last bastion of subject
matter exclusion'63 appears to be the "product of nature" doctrine
and its close relative, the 'laws of nature" doctrine-the categories
of items under the sun ostensibly not made by mankind, but rather
occurring naturally, without human intervention. Almost sixty
years ago, in Funk Bros. v. Kalo, the Supreme Court relied upon this
exception to invalidate a patent drawn to a mixture of bacteria
beneficial to root nodules.'64 Although the bacteria in the mixture
relied on the judicially-created, so-called 'business method' exception .... We take this
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived conception to rest.").
161. Arguably, the court has been right to do so. An early case often associated with this
proposition is O'Reilly v. Morse, in which Samuel Morse, having developed the telegraph,
applied for a patent with broad claims to any form of communication via electromagnetism.
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1854). The opinion invalidating his claims has been read as
holding that claims so broad as to encompass a law or phenomenon of nature-in Morse's
case, claims that effectively read on electromagnetism-are impermissible. See, e.g.,
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing O'Reilly). In fact, however, the decision in O'Reilly may
more properly be read to hold that Morse failed to enable the PHOSITA to make and use his
broadest claims.
This reading of Morse also suggests that the statement of the majority in SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004), that patentable subject
matter and scope of claims are unrelated is, at a minimum, overstated-had Morse narrowed
his claims to match his disclosure, they would not have read on an abstract idea. Cf. id. at
1321-23, 1329-33 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (applying a § 101 analysis to preclude the patenting
of a hemihydrate even though it was man made).
162. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
163. One other patentable subject matter doctrine that has shown surprising persistence
is the "printed matter" exception, which requires patents to cover physical items or processes,
rather than innovations composed entirely of new text. See, e.g., Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (denying patent protection to a method of hotel
management); Ex parte Gwinn, 112 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439 (B.P.A.I. 1955) (denying protection
to a new board game). It might reasonably have been expected that this doctrine was dead in
the wake of State Street, since both computer programs and business ideas that were
implemented in paper were patentable. 149 F.3d at 1371-75; see also In re Lowry, 32 F.3d
1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the claim that a data structure contained within a
computer's memory was "printed matter"). The Federal Circuit revived the doctrine in 2004
in In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a patent claim for adding
instructions to an RNA amplification kit).
164. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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were specifically chosen for their properties of infecting various
types of nodules without interfering with one another, the Court
reasoned that the bacteria in the mixture acted in precisely the
same way that they did in nature, precluding a patent claim on the
basis of their natural characteristics. 16
In recent jurisprudence, product of nature questions have
surfaced most often in relation to the chemical or biological sciences.
Patent claims to various biomolecules, such as adrenaline or DNA
sequences, are routinely granted, though these compounds surely
exist in "nature" as part of the biochemical complement of living
organisms. The courts have resolved this problem by permitting
the patenting of products of nature only when they have been either
physically transformed into something new or been isolated or
purified in a way that changes their economic significance. This
rule was established in the famous Learned Hand opinion in
Parke-Davis v. Mulford, which held that adrenaline salts were not
products of nature, despite having been drawn from human adrenal
tissue, because the claims were directed to a purified and isolated
form of the substance that was not found in nature and had
significant advantages over the naturally occurring product. 6
Similarly, to be patentable, claims to DNA are generally drawn
to molecules that have been isolated and purified from their natural
state-a product of human intervention, a state of the substance not
found in nature. 67 Those isolated and purified DNA sequences can
be used for purposes that naturally occurring DNA cannot, such as
the creation of chimeric bacteria that will express large quantities
of a protein. On this view, the product of nature exception will not
be a significant limit on patentable subject matter because the act
of isolation or purification will be sufficient to make an existing
product into a new thing.
Yet this doctrine continues to trouble many who perceive, with
some justification, that these inventions are in some sense inherent
165. Id.
166. 189 F. 95, 113, 114 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496; see also
In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding pure form of natural
prostaglandins patentable).
167. See, e.g., Alloway, supra note 7, at 75. Another distinguishing factor is that some
claims are drawn to cDNA, which is a construct made through reverse transcription of RNA
and not actually found in nature itself.
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in the natural world and that a biomolecule or other substance
ubiquitous in living organisms is already in the "possession" of the
public.16 In part, this points to the problem of characterizing this
subject matter category in terms of human intervention. The
bacterial mixture in Funk Bros. was surely the product of human
intervention, but the Supreme Court found that its properties were
not, and therefore it was a product of nature. By contrast, the
chimeric bacterium in Chakrabarty, which was also the product of
human intervention to harness in one bacterium the petroleum-
degrading properties of several natural organisms, was treated as
a new product. This leaves open the question as to how much
"intervention" or alteration is necessary to produce a product "made
by man[kind]" rather than a "natural" product. Stated differently,
if the sole remaining test for patentable subject matter focuses on
products of human ingenuity that, per the State Street formula,
produce a "useful result," might not that useful result be inherent
in the products of nature from which the invention was drawn?
Similar difficulties appear in a variation of the product of nature
doctrine dealing with laws of nature. Under this related doctrine,
natural laws and statements of mathematics are held to be unpat-
entable as "discoveries" rather than "inventions." The assumption
latent in this doctrine is that formulations of natural law, as well as
the language in which such formulations are made-mathematics
-are somehow hard wired into the fabric of the universe and so not
the product of human ingenuity. The Supreme Court has relied
upon this to deny patent protection to mathematical formulae and
to computer algorithms that seemed to read on mathematical
formulae.169
But read too broadly, the product of nature/law of nature doctrine
might well eviscerate all of patent law; after all, every human
creation draws upon materials from the natural world, assembled
according to the principles of natural laws. 7' Each invention is in
168. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 127 (2001); Eileen M.
Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707 (2004)
(discussing the patentability of DNA); Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of
Biotechnological Promise: The International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 641 (2004) (discussing patenting of genetic material).
169. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
170. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981) ('CTo accept the analysis proffered
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some sense a specific manifestation of natural materials and
natural laws, assembled by humans who are part of nature
themselves. Viewed this way, it is unclear exactly what this doctrine
is supposed to mean, or exactly where the dividing line might lie
between natural and unnatural. 71 The products of nature doctrine
might cover everything, or it might cover nothing.
Properly understood, the inherency doctrine may do the work that
the products of nature doctrine attempts to do in distinguishing
natural products from transformed ones, and therefore bringing
greater coherence to the distinction between natural and artificial
constructs. Having been conspicuously cast in terms of what it
means to be "made by man[kind]" and to "produce a useful result,"
patentable subject matter has effectively been cabined in terms of
making and using, the twin criteria we have already discussed as
giving rise to the question of inherency elsewhere in the patent
statute. This suggests that the touchstone to the subject matter
question is the one we have already identified: whether a substance
inherent in nature is already benefiting the public, or whether the
inventor has made useable an otherwise unused thing.
As a policy matter, this approach makes perfect sense. If people
already benefit from a product of nature, the discovery of that
benefit or its causes adds only a modest amount to our technological
capabilities and does not justify withdrawing from the public the
benefit they already receive. By contrast, if the public does not
already receive the benefit of a natural substance and it would not
be obvious to modify a natural product to produce such a benefit, a
discovery or modification that gives the world a new benefit is
precisely the sort of improvement that we want to encourage
through patent protection. In this view, the Parke-Davis holding
aligns with anticipation cases such as Cruciferous Sprout; an
inventor may properly patent isolated or purified products that
by the petitioner would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because
all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make
their implementation obvious.")
171. This is a common difficulty in appeals to "nature" or the "natural." See generally THE
MORAL AUTHORITY OF NATURE (Lorraine Daston & Fernando Vidal eds., 2004) (presenting a
series of essays reflecting on the meaning and authority of nature in historical and
contemporary contexts).
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provide a new benefit, but not merely a new discovery of a substance
or property already benefiting the public in its natural state.
172
Inherency also seems well-suited to explaining the prohibition
against patenting laws of nature. The objection to patenting natural
law or mathematical algorithms seems to be that such principles are
"inherent" in the universe, waiting to be discovered, and so not the
product of human ingenuity. Yet this characterization flies in the
face of the current understanding that scientific "laws" are human
constructs, clearly the products of human ingenuity,173 as is the
language of mathematics in which such laws are expressed.7 4 The
distinction between "invention" and "discovery" cannot credibly
account for declining to patent such human formulations. However,
these principles may well be said to be in public use, benefiting the
public, even if their formulation is unarticulated or unexpressed.
And, as elsewhere in patent law where inherency appears, mere
articulation or description of an already operative principle does not
qualify for patent protection.
In short, inherency can do the work that the products of nature
and laws of nature doctrines have found it hard to do by providing
a rationale for identifying those modified products of nature that are
worthy of patents. The products of nature doctrine may still retain
some vitality as a limitation on patenting unchanged natural
products, such as a plant newly discovered in a remote jungle.7 5 But
as a practical matter, such a narrowed doctrine would almost never
be used, and the doctrinal difficulties it has created could be
resolved through reliance on the inherency doctrine.
172. It is harder to square this result with General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28
F.2d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 1928), which held that a claim to "substantially pure tungsten" was
unpatentable because the characteristics of tungsten were natural products. Assuming that
the patentee had in fact given the public the benefit of purified tungsten for the first time,
however, it is likely that General Electric would come out the other way today.
173. See HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
(1992); JACOB BRONOWSKI, The Creative Mind, in SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 1, 4, 5, 7, 12-
15 (rev. ed. 1965); JACOB BRONOWSKI, The Abacus and the Rose: A New Dialogue on Two
World Systems, in SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES, supra, at 76, 88-91.
174. See PHILLIP J. DAVIS & REUBEN HERSH, THE MATHEMATICAL EXPERIENCE 410 (1981).
175. It is not clear that even this narrowed doctrine makes sense. There are perfectly good
policy arguments for allowing the patenting of new natural discoveries, if we are persuaded
that they are truly new to humans. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
180-82 (1974) (arguing that one who discovers a new plant has a moral entitlement to a
patent over it).
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D. Foreign Inherency
While the concept of inherency as public benefit makes sense, it
works only for existing benefits within the United States under
current law. Much of the prior art for biological materials that
might anticipate under the inherency doctrine is statutorily
excluded from consideration because it exists outside of the United
States. Although patents or printed publications from anywhere in
the world are relevant prior art under § 102, knowledge, use, or sale
of an item-the prior art most often at issue in inherency-are
considered prior art only if they occur within the United States.176
A charitable view of these restrictions might regard them as quaint
relics of the nineteenth century, when transnational communica-
tions were less reliable and when tangible evidence, such as a
printed publication demonstrating that an invention was antici-
pated, was deemed more solid than the rumor of foreign knowledge
or use. A less charitable view might regard them as mercantilist
provisions calculated to benefit American inventors, even if they
merely rediscovered what foreign scientists already knew.
In either view, recent commentators have suggested that the
exclusions have outlived their dubious usefulness and that domestic
and international prior art should be considered equally. 177 Legisla-
tion pending in Congress at this writing would accomplish just
that.17' Eliminating the geographic bias in the novelty and statutory
bar provisions would allow consideration of foreign knowledge, use,
and sales. This would likely have a profound impact on patents
drawn to the development of biological substances from traditional
medicines or other indigenous knowledge. In many cases of such
traditional knowledge, the public-albeit not the American
public-has been receiving the benefit of the underlying substance,
often for thousands of years.179 Allowing the inherency doctrine full
176. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
177. Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art
in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 683-84 (2003) (asserting that relevancy classifications
based on geographical origin conflict with the United States Constitution).
178. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b) (2005).
179. In one recent example in Europe, the EPO revoked EPO Patent 436,257, covering the
process of extracting a fungicide from the neem tree, on the basis of evidence from India that
the process had long been part of traditional knowledge. See Vir Singh, India Wins Seminal
Case Against Patent Relating to Traditional Indian Knowledge, 69 PAT., TRADEMARK &
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effect on such prior art might weaken some incentives for producing
straightforward versions of traditional remedies, but it would also
answer the increasingly loud charges of "biopiracy" leveled against
patenting of known treatments by firms in the developed nations."'°
Moreover, if the inherency doctrine is understood as it seems the
court now does understand it, globalizing prior art will not interfere
with true cases of drug development because work that involves
modifications to a product of nature that bring a new benefit to the
world will still be patentable.
Changing these rules would require congressional action, as the
discrimination is enshrined in the statute. Likely that will happen
eventually, as the domestic prior art restriction seems an artifact of
an older world. In the meantime, however, the Federal Circuit has
expanded the practical reach of foreign prior art in the Elsner case,
holding that a foreign publication that was not itself enabling could
anticipate a patent if it convincingly demonstrated that the
invention was in use abroad.'
COPYRIGHT J. 543 (2005).
180. For discussions of the claims of ownership to traditional knowledge, see INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, A SOURCEBOOK (Tom Greaves ed., 1994); Charles
R. McManis, Fitting Traditional Knowledge Protection and Biopiracy Claims into the Existing
Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition Framework, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 425 (Burton Ong ed., 2004). See also GRAHAM DUTFIELD, CAN THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT PROTECT BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIvERSITY? 5-13 (1997); Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004)
(discussing the public domain movement that argues against the privatization of knowledge);
Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case
for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. IN'L ECON. L. 371 (2004) (exploring protection for
traditional knowledge); Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New
Mercantilism, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 828 (2003) (reflecting on the debate over
the ownership of traditional knowledge and focusing on patents such as basmati rice and
turmeric).
181. In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. 374 F.3d 1151, 1152-58
(Fed. Cir. 2004). These prior art cases are part of a growing trend in the courts towards
expanding the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325,
1338-41 (Fed. Cir. 2005); NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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CONCLUSION
The inherency doctrine is central to patent law-a puzzle itself
inherent in the artifice of granting exclusive rights to the originator
of a given human innovation. The concept of innovation is at some
level a human conceit; patent law rewards "anything under the sun
made by man" if it is new as well as useful, but in a very real sense
there is nothing new under the sun. Much of our perception of
inventive novelty stems from sheer ignorance of our surroundings
or of the combinations already put into service by other persons, in
other places, at other times. When, on rare occasions, we are
confronted with the evidence of previous, often unwitting uses of a
supposedly new invention, the inherency doctrine serves to distin-
guish beneficial from gratuitous conceit, directing the choice of
fiction that will benefit the public most.
Inherency will serve that role only if it is properly understood,
and the key to understanding the doctrine is to focus on public
benefit, not knowledge. The long-standing judicial formulation of
the inherency test obscured that distinction, creating a doctrinal
morass. Fortunately, the Federal Circuit has recently put the
doctrine on a more reasonable footing, one that now offers coherence
to the previously fragmented concepts of inherency running
throughout the fundamental precepts of patent law.
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